Do We Need Placebos?

A news feature in Nature asks whether placebo controls are always a good idea: Why Fake It?



The piece looks at experimental neurosurgical treatments for Parkinson's, such as "Spheramine". This consists of cultured human cells, which are implanted directly into the brain of the sufferer. The idea is that the cells will grow and help produce dopamine, which is deficient in Parkinson's.



Peggy Willocks, a 44 year old teacher, took part in a trial of the surgery in 2000. She says it helped stave off the symptoms for years, but the development of Spheramine was axed in 2008 after a controlled trial found it didn't work any better than a placebo.



The placebo was "sham surgery" i.e. putting the patient through a full surgical procedure, and making holes in their skull, but without doing anything to their brain.



It's cheap and easy to do a placebo controlled trial of a drug - all you need is a sugar pill. But with neurosurgery, it's clearly a lot more involved. A placebo has to be believable. Convincing sham surgery is expensive, time-consuming, and it has real risks, albeit small ones.



Is it ethical to put patients through that?



That, I think, can only be decided on a trial-by-trial basis. It depends on the likely benefits of the treatment, and whether the trial is scientifically sound. Obviously, it'd be wrong to do sham surgery as part of a flawed trial that won't tell us anything useful.



The Nature article, however, goes further than this, and suggests that placebo controlled trials may be unsuitable for testing these kinds of treatments, failing to detect a real benefit in some patients:

There are hints from some of the failed phase II trials that patients followed up beyond study endpoints might tell a more positive story. Some say, therefore, that sham controls are sinking the prospects of valuable drugs.



Anders Björklund, a neuroscientist at Lund University in Sweden who is collaborating with [Roger Barker of Cambridge], says that sham surgery can lead researchers to throw out a strategy prematurely if the trial fails because of technical or methodological glitches rather than a true lack of efficacy.

A patient advocate agrees:

According to Perry Cohen, who leads a network of patient activists called the Parkinson Pipeline Project, that’s exactly what is happening. He had always questioned the need for sham surgery, he says, but after the string of phase II failures, “We started saying, ‘Hey, this is a problem. These trials failed, but we know they are working for some people.’”

...Cohen [says] that patients have different priorities and that researchers must take these into account. Researchers use placebo controls to weed out false positives. But for patients, the real ogre is the false negatives — which can sink a therapy before it has been optimized.

I'm not sure about this. If I had Parkinson's, I would certainly hate to miss out on the genuine cure because a trial had failed to recognize that it worked. But equally, I would not be happy to be given a rubbish treatment that would have failed a placebo controlled trial, but never got one, because of arguments like this.



Placebo controlled trials can fail to detect benefits if they are too short, too small, methodologically flawed, or whatever. Certainly, a trial can be placebo controlled, and still crap. But the answer is surely to do better trials, not no trials.



It may well be that we shouldn't rush to do placebo controlled trials until later in the development process, when the technique has been properly refined. But the history of medicine is littered with treatments that "we know work for some people" - that didn't.



Katsnelson, A. (2011). Experimental therapies for Parkinson's disease: Why fake it? Nature, 476 (7359), 142-144 DOI: 10.1038/476142a

Do We Need Placebos?

A news feature in Nature asks whether placebo controls are always a good idea: Why Fake It?



The piece looks at experimental neurosurgical treatments for Parkinson's, such as "Spheramine". This consists of cultured human cells, which are implanted directly into the brain of the sufferer. The idea is that the cells will grow and help produce dopamine, which is deficient in Parkinson's.



Peggy Willocks, a 44 year old teacher, took part in a trial of the surgery in 2000. She says it helped stave off the symptoms for years, but the development of Spheramine was axed in 2008 after a controlled trial found it didn't work any better than a placebo.



The placebo was "sham surgery" i.e. putting the patient through a full surgical procedure, and making holes in their skull, but without doing anything to their brain.



It's cheap and easy to do a placebo controlled trial of a drug - all you need is a sugar pill. But with neurosurgery, it's clearly a lot more involved. A placebo has to be believable. Convincing sham surgery is expensive, time-consuming, and it has real risks, albeit small ones.



Is it ethical to put patients through that?



That, I think, can only be decided on a trial-by-trial basis. It depends on the likely benefits of the treatment, and whether the trial is scientifically sound. Obviously, it'd be wrong to do sham surgery as part of a flawed trial that won't tell us anything useful.



The Nature article, however, goes further than this, and suggests that placebo controlled trials may be unsuitable for testing these kinds of treatments, failing to detect a real benefit in some patients:

There are hints from some of the failed phase II trials that patients followed up beyond study endpoints might tell a more positive story. Some say, therefore, that sham controls are sinking the prospects of valuable drugs.



Anders Björklund, a neuroscientist at Lund University in Sweden who is collaborating with [Roger Barker of Cambridge], says that sham surgery can lead researchers to throw out a strategy prematurely if the trial fails because of technical or methodological glitches rather than a true lack of efficacy.

A patient advocate agrees:

According to Perry Cohen, who leads a network of patient activists called the Parkinson Pipeline Project, that’s exactly what is happening. He had always questioned the need for sham surgery, he says, but after the string of phase II failures, “We started saying, ‘Hey, this is a problem. These trials failed, but we know they are working for some people.’”

...Cohen [says] that patients have different priorities and that researchers must take these into account. Researchers use placebo controls to weed out false positives. But for patients, the real ogre is the false negatives — which can sink a therapy before it has been optimized.

I'm not sure about this. If I had Parkinson's, I would certainly hate to miss out on the genuine cure because a trial had failed to recognize that it worked. But equally, I would not be happy to be given a rubbish treatment that would have failed a placebo controlled trial, but never got one, because of arguments like this.



Placebo controlled trials can fail to detect benefits if they are too short, too small, methodologically flawed, or whatever. Certainly, a trial can be placebo controlled, and still crap. But the answer is surely to do better trials, not no trials.



It may well be that we shouldn't rush to do placebo controlled trials until later in the development process, when the technique has been properly refined. But the history of medicine is littered with treatments that "we know work for some people" - that didn't.



Katsnelson, A. (2011). Experimental therapies for Parkinson's disease: Why fake it? Nature, 476 (7359), 142-144 DOI: 10.1038/476142a

Fake Clinical Trial - Real Problems

Here at Neuroskeptic we've seen our fair share of dubious clinical trials over the years, but the Indian Journal of Psychiatry has just published one which really takes the biscuit, because it was completely made up.



Luckily, the trial is actually a rather neat spoof paper, written for educational purposes to highlight bad practices in the design and writing up of clinical trials. It's accompanied by a serious piece which analyzes these problems. They're both open access so you can take a look.

The sham study is ostensibly a trial of a new antidepressant, "placeboxetine", compared to an older drug for depression - but it was really written by one of the Editors of the journal via "Common shortcomings in manuscripts submitted to the Indian Journal of Psychiatry were collated into a single manuscript". These shortcomings are certainly not limited to Indian papers.

The problems included:

• No placebo group. This is extremely common in trials comparing two drugs, so it's "accepted practice", but it's still a bad thing.
  
• The "placeboxetine" was given at a higher dose, relative to its dose range, than the comparison drug but they don't say why.
• Side effects are reported but they don't explain how these were assessed. If you specifically ask about them you find a lot more than if you rely on patients to spontaneously complain.
• Subtle, but important, issues with the statistics, such as reliance on t-tests over more appropriate methods.
• The trial had some unusual features for a depression trial - with no explanation. Most patients were males in their 20s, while the norm is for about 65% females and an average age in the 40s; very few people dropped out; very few people who were screened were excluded, whereas most trials exclude loads of people for all kinds of reasons.
• The effectiveness of both drugs was remarkably high (75% cure rate over 6 weeks - better than any treatment, drug or therapy, would be expected to show.) Yet they don't mention this.
• It was badly written. The title in particular was far too long and clumsy.
• It turns out that the trial was sponsored by the fictional pharmaceutical company, and was probably conducted to help get placeboxetine sold in India - but we only find this out in the small print at the end.
• Hot pink and white is not a good color scheme for your graphs, or for anything except marshmallows. (I may have added this myself.)
  

Overall I think this kind of thing is extremely valuable. The author's final comments, however, are a bit questionable. He advises people running clinical trials to base their research protocol, and their paper, on previously published studies of a similar nature published in good journals. Unfortunately, even leading journals publish stuff which suffers from some of these problems...

Andrade C (2011). A 6-week, multicentre, randomized controlled clinical trial to evaluate the safety and efficacy of placeboxetine hydrochloride in the treatment of major depressive disorder in an Indian setting. Indian journal of psychiatry, 53 (1), 69-72 PMID: 21431013

Andrade C (2011). Placeboxetine for major depressive disorder: Researcher, author, reader, and reviewer perspectives on randomized controlled trials. Indian journal of psychiatry, 53 (1), 73-6 PMID: 21431014

Fake Clinical Trial - Real Problems

Here at Neuroskeptic we've seen our fair share of dubious clinical trials over the years, but the Indian Journal of Psychiatry has just published one which really takes the biscuit, because it was completely made up.



Luckily, the trial is actually a rather neat spoof paper, written for educational purposes to highlight bad practices in the design and writing up of clinical trials. It's accompanied by a serious piece which analyzes these problems. They're both open access so you can take a look.

The sham study is ostensibly a trial of a new antidepressant, "placeboxetine", compared to an older drug for depression - but it was really written by one of the Editors of the journal via "Common shortcomings in manuscripts submitted to the Indian Journal of Psychiatry were collated into a single manuscript". These shortcomings are certainly not limited to Indian papers.

The problems included:

• No placebo group. This is extremely common in trials comparing two drugs, so it's "accepted practice", but it's still a bad thing.
  
• The "placeboxetine" was given at a higher dose, relative to its dose range, than the comparison drug but they don't say why.
• Side effects are reported but they don't explain how these were assessed. If you specifically ask about them you find a lot more than if you rely on patients to spontaneously complain.
• Subtle, but important, issues with the statistics, such as reliance on t-tests over more appropriate methods.
• The trial had some unusual features for a depression trial - with no explanation. Most patients were males in their 20s, while the norm is for about 65% females and an average age in the 40s; very few people dropped out; very few people who were screened were excluded, whereas most trials exclude loads of people for all kinds of reasons.
• The effectiveness of both drugs was remarkably high (75% cure rate over 6 weeks - better than any treatment, drug or therapy, would be expected to show.) Yet they don't mention this.
• It was badly written. The title in particular was far too long and clumsy.
• It turns out that the trial was sponsored by the fictional pharmaceutical company, and was probably conducted to help get placeboxetine sold in India - but we only find this out in the small print at the end.
• Hot pink and white is not a good color scheme for your graphs, or for anything except marshmallows. (I may have added this myself.)
  

Overall I think this kind of thing is extremely valuable. The author's final comments, however, are a bit questionable. He advises people running clinical trials to base their research protocol, and their paper, on previously published studies of a similar nature published in good journals. Unfortunately, even leading journals publish stuff which suffers from some of these problems...

Andrade C (2011). A 6-week, multicentre, randomized controlled clinical trial to evaluate the safety and efficacy of placeboxetine hydrochloride in the treatment of major depressive disorder in an Indian setting. Indian journal of psychiatry, 53 (1), 69-72 PMID: 21431013

Andrade C (2011). Placeboxetine for major depressive disorder: Researcher, author, reader, and reviewer perspectives on randomized controlled trials. Indian journal of psychiatry, 53 (1), 73-6 PMID: 21431014

A Stroke Of Good Fortune Cures OCD?

A 45 year old female teacher had a history of severe obsessive-compulsive disorder, along with other problems including ADHD. Her daughter, and many other people in her family, had suffered the same problems and in a few cases had Tourette's Syndrome.But all that changed - when she suffered a stroke. This is according to a brief case report from Drs. Diamond and Ondo of Texas:

[she] had a long history of constant intrusive and obsessive thoughts that interrupted her daily activities and sleep. She had constant unfounded fears that something bad would happen to her family and had persistent violent thoughts of using knives to harm family members. She would check the door locks up to 15 times a day. In addition to her OCD symptoms, she had ... inattention, poor concentration, and difficulty sitting still.

She had never been treated for the OCD, despite how it interfered with her life, because she feared losing her job as a teacher if she sought psychiatric help. But then...

Nine months before approaching us, she developed the acute onset of paresthesia [weird sensations] and weakness in the left upper extremity and face, associated with slurred speech. Initially, she was unable to lift her arm against gravity.

These are classic signs of a stroke, but it was a very mild one, because the symptoms only lasted a few minutes and were pretty much gone even before she arrived at the emergency room. She made a full recovery. More than a full recovery in fact:

Within weeks of her stroke, she realized that her obsessive and intrusive thoughts, fears, rituals, and impulsive behavior had completely resolved. In addition, there was some improvement in her temperament. There was no improvement in attention or concentration. Owing to her improvement in neuropsychiatric symptoms, she strongly felt that her stroke was beneficial. These benefits have persisted for 24 months.

Most medical case reports concern patients who died, or got really sick, in a particularly interesting fashion, but this one has a happy ending. Strokes can be devastating, of course, although people also make full recoveries - it all depends on the severity of the stroke, and whether they get prompt treatment.

There have been a few other cases of brain damage which brought unexpectedly beneficial effects. In Vietnam veterans, for example, people with damage to the vmPFC due to combat trauma seemed to be protected from depression.

Whether the stroke really cured her, or whether it was some kind of psychological "placebo" effect, we'll never know. It's hard to see why a stroke would have a placebo effect, but on the other hand, an MRI scan revealed that the stroke occured in an area of the brain - the right frontoparietal cortex - which is fairly low down on the list of "OCD-ish" areas.

The authors make some vague comments about "modulation of the cortical–subcortical circuits" but this is really the neuroscientific equivalent of saying "We guess it did something", because the entire brain is made of cortical-subcortical circuits, given that the cortex is at the top and everything else is, by definition, the sub-cortex. It's quite possible. But we really can't tell.

Diamond A, & Ondo WG (2011). Resolution of Severe Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder After a Small Unilateral Nondominant Frontoparietal Infarct. The International journal of neuroscience PMID: 21426244

A Stroke Of Good Fortune Cures OCD?

A 45 year old female teacher had a history of severe obsessive-compulsive disorder, along with other problems including ADHD. Her daughter, and many other people in her family, had suffered the same problems and in a few cases had Tourette's Syndrome.But all that changed - when she suffered a stroke. This is according to a brief case report from Drs. Diamond and Ondo of Texas:

[she] had a long history of constant intrusive and obsessive thoughts that interrupted her daily activities and sleep. She had constant unfounded fears that something bad would happen to her family and had persistent violent thoughts of using knives to harm family members. She would check the door locks up to 15 times a day. In addition to her OCD symptoms, she had ... inattention, poor concentration, and difficulty sitting still.

She had never been treated for the OCD, despite how it interfered with her life, because she feared losing her job as a teacher if she sought psychiatric help. But then...

Nine months before approaching us, she developed the acute onset of paresthesia [weird sensations] and weakness in the left upper extremity and face, associated with slurred speech. Initially, she was unable to lift her arm against gravity.

These are classic signs of a stroke, but it was a very mild one, because the symptoms only lasted a few minutes and were pretty much gone even before she arrived at the emergency room. She made a full recovery. More than a full recovery in fact:

Within weeks of her stroke, she realized that her obsessive and intrusive thoughts, fears, rituals, and impulsive behavior had completely resolved. In addition, there was some improvement in her temperament. There was no improvement in attention or concentration. Owing to her improvement in neuropsychiatric symptoms, she strongly felt that her stroke was beneficial. These benefits have persisted for 24 months.

Most medical case reports concern patients who died, or got really sick, in a particularly interesting fashion, but this one has a happy ending. Strokes can be devastating, of course, although people also make full recoveries - it all depends on the severity of the stroke, and whether they get prompt treatment.

There have been a few other cases of brain damage which brought unexpectedly beneficial effects. In Vietnam veterans, for example, people with damage to the vmPFC due to combat trauma seemed to be protected from depression.

Whether the stroke really cured her, or whether it was some kind of psychological "placebo" effect, we'll never know. It's hard to see why a stroke would have a placebo effect, but on the other hand, an MRI scan revealed that the stroke occured in an area of the brain - the right frontoparietal cortex - which is fairly low down on the list of "OCD-ish" areas.

The authors make some vague comments about "modulation of the cortical–subcortical circuits" but this is really the neuroscientific equivalent of saying "We guess it did something", because the entire brain is made of cortical-subcortical circuits, given that the cortex is at the top and everything else is, by definition, the sub-cortex. It's quite possible. But we really can't tell.

Diamond A, & Ondo WG (2011). Resolution of Severe Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder After a Small Unilateral Nondominant Frontoparietal Infarct. The International journal of neuroscience PMID: 21426244

Paxil: The Whole Truth?

Paroxetine, aka Paxil aka Seroxat, is an SSRI antidepressant.

Like other SSRIs, its reputation has see-sawed over time. Hailed as miracle drugs in the 1990s and promoted for everything from depression to "separation anxiety" in dogs, they fell from grace over the past decade.

First, concerns emerged over withdrawal symptoms and suicidality especially in young people. Then more recently their antidepressant efficacy came into serious question. Paroxetine has arguably the worst image of all SSRIs, although whether it's much different to the rest is unclear.

Now a new paper claims to provide a definitive assessment of the safety and efficacy of paroxetine in adults (age 18+). The lead authors are from GlaxoSmithKline, who invented paroxetine. So it's no surprise that the text paints GSK and their product in a favourable light, but the data warrant a close look and the results are rather interesting - and complicated.

They took all of the placebo-controlled trials on paroxetine for any psychiatric disorder - because it wasn't just trialled in depression, but also in PTSD, anxiety, and more. They excluded studies with fewer than 30 people; this makes sense though it's somewhat arbitrary, why not 40 or 20? Anyway, they ended up with 61 trials.

First they looked at suicide. In a nutshell paroxetine increased suicidal "behaviour or ideation" in younger patients (age 25 or below) relative to placebo, whether or not they were being treated for depression. In older patients, it only increased suicidality in the depression trials, and the effect was smaller. I've put a red dot where paroxetine was worse than placebo; this doesn't mean the effect was "statistically significant", but the numbers are so small that this is fairly meaningless. Just look at the numbers.

This is not very new. It's been accepted for a while that broadly the same applies when you look at trials of other antidepressants. Whether this causes extra suicides in the real world is a big question.

When it comes to efficacy, however, we find some rather startling info that's not been presented together in one article before, to my knowledge. Here's a graph showing the effect of paroxetine over-and-above placebo in all the different disorders, expressed as a proportion of the improvement seen in the placebo group.

Now I should point out that I just made this measure up. It's not ideal. If the placebo response is very small, then a tiny drug effect will seem large by comparison, even if what this really means is that neither drug nor placebo do any good.

However the flip side of that coin is that it controls for the fact that rating scales for different disorders might be just more likely to show change than others. The d score is a more widely used standardized measure of effect size - though it has its own shortcomings - and I'd like to know those, but the data they provide don't allow us to easily calculate it. You could do it from the GSK database but it would take ages.

Anyway as you can see paroxetine was better, relative to placebo, against PTSD, PMDD, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and social anxiety, than it was against depression measured with the "gold-standard" HAMD scale! In fact the only thing it was worse against was Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Using the alternative MADRS depression scale, the antidepressant effect was bigger, but still small compared to OCD and social anxiety.

This is rather remarkable. Everyone calls paroxetine "an antidepressant", yet at least in one important sense it works better against OCD and social anxiety than it does against depression!

In fact, is paroxetine an antidepressant at all? It works better on MADRS and very poorly on the HAMD; is this because the HAMD is a better scale of depression, and the MADRS actually measures anxiety or OCD symptoms?

That's a lovely neat theory... but in fact the HAMD-17 has two questions about anxiety, scoring 0-4 points each, so you can score up to 8 (or 12 if you count "hypochondriasis", which is basically health anxiety, so you probably should), out of a total maximum of 52. The MADRS has one anxiety item with a max score of 6 on a total of 60. So the HAMD is more "anxious" than the MADRS.

This is more than just a curiosity. Paroxetine's antidepressant effect was tiny in those aged 25 or under on the HAMD - treatment just 9% of the placebo effect - but on the MADRS in the same age group, the benefit was 35%! So what is the HAMD measuring and why is it different to the MADRS?

Honestly, it's hard to tell because the Hamilton scale is so messy. It measures depression and the other distressing symptoms which commonly go along with it. The idea, I think, was that it was meant to be a scale of the patient's overall clinical severity - how seriously they were suffering - rather than a measure of depression per se.

Which is fine. Except that most modern trials carefully exclude anyone with "comorbid" symptoms like anxiety, and on the other hand, recruit people with symptoms quite different to the depressed inpatients that Dr Max Hamilton would have seen when he invented the scale in 1960.

Yet 50 years later the HAMD17, unmodified, is still the standard scale. It's been repeatedly shown to be multi-factorial (it doesn't measure one thing), no-one even agrees on how to interpret it, and a "new scale", the HAMD6, which consists of simply chucking out 11 questions and keeping the 6 that actually measure depression, has been shown to be better. Yet everyone still uses the HAMD17 because everyone else does.

Link: I recently covered a dodgy paper about paroxetine in adolescents with depression; it wasn't included in this analysis because this was about adults.

Carpenter DJ, Fong R, Kraus JE, Davies JT, Moore C, & Thase ME (2011). Meta-analysis of efficacy and treatment-emergent suicidality in adults by psychiatric indication and age subgroup following initiation of paroxetine therapy: a complete set of randomized placebo-controlled trials. The Journal of clinical psychiatry PMID: 21367354

Paxil: The Whole Truth?

Paroxetine, aka Paxil aka Seroxat, is an SSRI antidepressant.

Like other SSRIs, its reputation has see-sawed over time. Hailed as miracle drugs in the 1990s and promoted for everything from depression to "separation anxiety" in dogs, they fell from grace over the past decade.

First, concerns emerged over withdrawal symptoms and suicidality especially in young people. Then more recently their antidepressant efficacy came into serious question. Paroxetine has arguably the worst image of all SSRIs, although whether it's much different to the rest is unclear.

Now a new paper claims to provide a definitive assessment of the safety and efficacy of paroxetine in adults (age 18+). The lead authors are from GlaxoSmithKline, who invented paroxetine. So it's no surprise that the text paints GSK and their product in a favourable light, but the data warrant a close look and the results are rather interesting - and complicated.

They took all of the placebo-controlled trials on paroxetine for any psychiatric disorder - because it wasn't just trialled in depression, but also in PTSD, anxiety, and more. They excluded studies with fewer than 30 people; this makes sense though it's somewhat arbitrary, why not 40 or 20? Anyway, they ended up with 61 trials.

First they looked at suicide. In a nutshell paroxetine increased suicidal "behaviour or ideation" in younger patients (age 25 or below) relative to placebo, whether or not they were being treated for depression. In older patients, it only increased suicidality in the depression trials, and the effect was smaller. I've put a red dot where paroxetine was worse than placebo; this doesn't mean the effect was "statistically significant", but the numbers are so small that this is fairly meaningless. Just look at the numbers.

This is not very new. It's been accepted for a while that broadly the same applies when you look at trials of other antidepressants. Whether this causes extra suicides in the real world is a big question.

When it comes to efficacy, however, we find some rather startling info that's not been presented together in one article before, to my knowledge. Here's a graph showing the effect of paroxetine over-and-above placebo in all the different disorders, expressed as a proportion of the improvement seen in the placebo group.

Now I should point out that I just made this measure up. It's not ideal. If the placebo response is very small, then a tiny drug effect will seem large by comparison, even if what this really means is that neither drug nor placebo do any good.

However the flip side of that coin is that it controls for the fact that rating scales for different disorders might be just more likely to show change than others. The d score is a more widely used standardized measure of effect size - though it has its own shortcomings - and I'd like to know those, but the data they provide don't allow us to easily calculate it. You could do it from the GSK database but it would take ages.

Anyway as you can see paroxetine was better, relative to placebo, against PTSD, PMDD, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and social anxiety, than it was against depression measured with the "gold-standard" HAMD scale! In fact the only thing it was worse against was Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Using the alternative MADRS depression scale, the antidepressant effect was bigger, but still small compared to OCD and social anxiety.

This is rather remarkable. Everyone calls paroxetine "an antidepressant", yet at least in one important sense it works better against OCD and social anxiety than it does against depression!

In fact, is paroxetine an antidepressant at all? It works better on MADRS and very poorly on the HAMD; is this because the HAMD is a better scale of depression, and the MADRS actually measures anxiety or OCD symptoms?

That's a lovely neat theory... but in fact the HAMD-17 has two questions about anxiety, scoring 0-4 points each, so you can score up to 8 (or 12 if you count "hypochondriasis", which is basically health anxiety, so you probably should), out of a total maximum of 52. The MADRS has one anxiety item with a max score of 6 on a total of 60. So the HAMD is more "anxious" than the MADRS.

This is more than just a curiosity. Paroxetine's antidepressant effect was tiny in those aged 25 or under on the HAMD - treatment just 9% of the placebo effect - but on the MADRS in the same age group, the benefit was 35%! So what is the HAMD measuring and why is it different to the MADRS?

Honestly, it's hard to tell because the Hamilton scale is so messy. It measures depression and the other distressing symptoms which commonly go along with it. The idea, I think, was that it was meant to be a scale of the patient's overall clinical severity - how seriously they were suffering - rather than a measure of depression per se.

Which is fine. Except that most modern trials carefully exclude anyone with "comorbid" symptoms like anxiety, and on the other hand, recruit people with symptoms quite different to the depressed inpatients that Dr Max Hamilton would have seen when he invented the scale in 1960.

Yet 50 years later the HAMD17, unmodified, is still the standard scale. It's been repeatedly shown to be multi-factorial (it doesn't measure one thing), no-one even agrees on how to interpret it, and a "new scale", the HAMD6, which consists of simply chucking out 11 questions and keeping the 6 that actually measure depression, has been shown to be better. Yet everyone still uses the HAMD17 because everyone else does.

Link: I recently covered a dodgy paper about paroxetine in adolescents with depression; it wasn't included in this analysis because this was about adults.

Carpenter DJ, Fong R, Kraus JE, Davies JT, Moore C, & Thase ME (2011). Meta-analysis of efficacy and treatment-emergent suicidality in adults by psychiatric indication and age subgroup following initiation of paroxetine therapy: a complete set of randomized placebo-controlled trials. The Journal of clinical psychiatry PMID: 21367354

The Web of Morgellons

A fascinating new paper: Morgellons Disease, or Antipsychotic-Responsive Delusional Parasitosis, in an HIV Patient: Beliefs in The Age of the Internet

“Mr. A” was a 43-year-old man...His most pressing medical complaint was worrisome fatigue. He was not depressed...had no formal psychiatric history, no family psychiatric history, and he was a successful businessman.

He was referred to the psychiatry department by his primary-care physician (PCP) because of a 2-year-long complaint of pruritus [itching] accompanied by the belief of being infested with parasites. Numerous visits to the infectious disease clinic and an extensive medical work-up...had not uncovered any medical disorder, to the patient’s great frustration.

Although no parasites were ever trapped, Mr. A caused skin damage by probing for them and by applying topical solutions such as hydrogen peroxide to “bring them to the surface.” After reading about Morgellons disease on the Internet, he “recalled” extruding particles from his skin, including “dirt” and “fuzz.”

During the initial consultation visit with the psychiatrist, Mr. A was apprehensive but cautiously optimistic that a medication could help. The psychiatrist had been forewarned by the PCP that the patient had discovered a website describing Morgellons and “latched onto” this diagnosis.

However, it was notable that the patient allowed the possibility (“30%”) that he was suffering from delusions (and not Morgellons), mostly because he trusted his PCP, “who has taken very good care of me for many years.”

The patient agreed to a risperidone [an antipsychotic] trial of up to 2 mg per day. [i.e. a lowish dose]. Within weeks, his preoccupation with being infested lessened significantly... Although not 100% convinced that he might not have Morgellons disease, he is no longer pruritic and is no longer damaging his skin or trying to trap insects. He remains greatly improved 1 year later.

(Mr A. had also been HIV+ for 20 years, but he still had good immune function and the HIV may have had nothing to do with the case.)

"Morgellons" is, according to people who say they suffer from it, a mysterious disease characterised by the feeling of parasites or insects moving underneath the skin, accompanied by skin lesions out of which emerge strange, brightly-coloured fibres or threads. Other symptoms include fatigue, aches and pains, and difficulty concentrating.

According to almost all doctors, there are no parasites, the lesions are caused by the patient's own scratching or attempts to dig out the non-existent critters, and the fibres come from clothes, carpets, or other textiles which the patient has somehow inserted into their own skin. It may seem unbelievable that someone could do this "unconsciously", but stranger things have happened.

As the authors of this paper, Freudenreich et al, say, Morgellons is a disease of the internet age. It was "discovered" in 2002 by a Mary Leitao, with Patient Zero being her own 2 year old son. Since then its fame, and the reported number of cases, has grown steadily - especially in California.

Delusional parasitosis is the opposite of Morgellons: doctors believe in it, but the people who have it, don't. It's seen in some mental disorders and is also quite common in abusers of certain drugs like methamphetamine. It feels like there are bugs beneath your skin. There aren't, but the belief that there are is very powerful.

This then is the raw material in most cases; what the concept of "Morgellons" adds is a theory, a social context and a set of expectations that helps make sense of the otherwise baffling symptoms. And as we know expectations, whether positive or negative, tend to be become experiences. The diagnosis doesn't create the symptoms out of nowhere but rather takes them and reshapes them into a coherent pattern.

As Freudenreich et al note, doctors may be tempted to argue with the patient - you don't have Morgellons, there's no such thing, it's absurd - but the whole point is that mainstream medicine couldn't explain the symptoms, which is why the patient turned to less orthodox ideas.

Remember the extensive tests that came up negative "to the patient’s great frustration." And remember that "delusional parasitosis" is not an explanation, just a description, of the symptoms. To diagnose someone with that is saying "We've no idea why but you've imagined this". True, maybe, but not very palatable.

Rather, they say, doctors should just suggest that maybe there's something else going on, and should prescribe a treatment on that basis. Not rejecting the patient's beliefs but saying, maybe you're right, but in my experience this treatment makes people with your condition feel better, and that's why you're here, right?

Whether the pills worked purely as a placebo or whether there was a direct pharmacological effect, we'll never know. Probably it was a bit of both. It's not clear that it's important, really. The patient improved, and it's unlikely that it would have worked as well if they'd been given in a negative atmosphere of coercion or rejection - if indeed he'd agreed to take them at all.

Morgellons is a classic case of a disease that consists of an underlying experience filtered through the lens of a socially-transmitted interpretation. But every disease is that, to a degree. Even the most rigorously "medical" conditions like cancer also come with a set of expectations and a social meaning; psychiatric disorders certainly do.

I guess Morgellons is too new to be a textbook case yet - but it should be. Everyone with an interest in the mind, everyone who treats diseases, and everyone who's ever been ill - everyone really - ought to be familiar with it because while it's an extreme case, it's not unique. "All life is here" in those tangled little fibres.

Freudenreich O, Kontos N, Tranulis C, & Cather C (2010). Morgellons disease, or antipsychotic-responsive delusional parasitosis, in an hiv patient: beliefs in the age of the internet. Psychosomatics, 51 (6), 453-7 PMID: 21051675

The Web of Morgellons

A fascinating new paper: Morgellons Disease, or Antipsychotic-Responsive Delusional Parasitosis, in an HIV Patient: Beliefs in The Age of the Internet

“Mr. A” was a 43-year-old man...His most pressing medical complaint was worrisome fatigue. He was not depressed...had no formal psychiatric history, no family psychiatric history, and he was a successful businessman.

He was referred to the psychiatry department by his primary-care physician (PCP) because of a 2-year-long complaint of pruritus [itching] accompanied by the belief of being infested with parasites. Numerous visits to the infectious disease clinic and an extensive medical work-up...had not uncovered any medical disorder, to the patient’s great frustration.

Although no parasites were ever trapped, Mr. A caused skin damage by probing for them and by applying topical solutions such as hydrogen peroxide to “bring them to the surface.” After reading about Morgellons disease on the Internet, he “recalled” extruding particles from his skin, including “dirt” and “fuzz.”

During the initial consultation visit with the psychiatrist, Mr. A was apprehensive but cautiously optimistic that a medication could help. The psychiatrist had been forewarned by the PCP that the patient had discovered a website describing Morgellons and “latched onto” this diagnosis.

However, it was notable that the patient allowed the possibility (“30%”) that he was suffering from delusions (and not Morgellons), mostly because he trusted his PCP, “who has taken very good care of me for many years.”

The patient agreed to a risperidone [an antipsychotic] trial of up to 2 mg per day. [i.e. a lowish dose]. Within weeks, his preoccupation with being infested lessened significantly... Although not 100% convinced that he might not have Morgellons disease, he is no longer pruritic and is no longer damaging his skin or trying to trap insects. He remains greatly improved 1 year later.

(Mr A. had also been HIV+ for 20 years, but he still had good immune function and the HIV may have had nothing to do with the case.)

"Morgellons" is, according to people who say they suffer from it, a mysterious disease characterised by the feeling of parasites or insects moving underneath the skin, accompanied by skin lesions out of which emerge strange, brightly-coloured fibres or threads. Other symptoms include fatigue, aches and pains, and difficulty concentrating.

According to almost all doctors, there are no parasites, the lesions are caused by the patient's own scratching or attempts to dig out the non-existent critters, and the fibres come from clothes, carpets, or other textiles which the patient has somehow inserted into their own skin. It may seem unbelievable that someone could do this "unconsciously", but stranger things have happened.

As the authors of this paper, Freudenreich et al, say, Morgellons is a disease of the internet age. It was "discovered" in 2002 by a Mary Leitao, with Patient Zero being her own 2 year old son. Since then its fame, and the reported number of cases, has grown steadily - especially in California.

Delusional parasitosis is the opposite of Morgellons: doctors believe in it, but the people who have it, don't. It's seen in some mental disorders and is also quite common in abusers of certain drugs like methamphetamine. It feels like there are bugs beneath your skin. There aren't, but the belief that there are is very powerful.

This then is the raw material in most cases; what the concept of "Morgellons" adds is a theory, a social context and a set of expectations that helps make sense of the otherwise baffling symptoms. And as we know expectations, whether positive or negative, tend to be become experiences. The diagnosis doesn't create the symptoms out of nowhere but rather takes them and reshapes them into a coherent pattern.

As Freudenreich et al note, doctors may be tempted to argue with the patient - you don't have Morgellons, there's no such thing, it's absurd - but the whole point is that mainstream medicine couldn't explain the symptoms, which is why the patient turned to less orthodox ideas.

Remember the extensive tests that came up negative "to the patient’s great frustration." And remember that "delusional parasitosis" is not an explanation, just a description, of the symptoms. To diagnose someone with that is saying "We've no idea why but you've imagined this". True, maybe, but not very palatable.

Rather, they say, doctors should just suggest that maybe there's something else going on, and should prescribe a treatment on that basis. Not rejecting the patient's beliefs but saying, maybe you're right, but in my experience this treatment makes people with your condition feel better, and that's why you're here, right?

Whether the pills worked purely as a placebo or whether there was a direct pharmacological effect, we'll never know. Probably it was a bit of both. It's not clear that it's important, really. The patient improved, and it's unlikely that it would have worked as well if they'd been given in a negative atmosphere of coercion or rejection - if indeed he'd agreed to take them at all.

Morgellons is a classic case of a disease that consists of an underlying experience filtered through the lens of a socially-transmitted interpretation. But every disease is that, to a degree. Even the most rigorously "medical" conditions like cancer also come with a set of expectations and a social meaning; psychiatric disorders certainly do.

I guess Morgellons is too new to be a textbook case yet - but it should be. Everyone with an interest in the mind, everyone who treats diseases, and everyone who's ever been ill - everyone really - ought to be familiar with it because while it's an extreme case, it's not unique. "All life is here" in those tangled little fibres.

Freudenreich O, Kontos N, Tranulis C, & Cather C (2010). Morgellons disease, or antipsychotic-responsive delusional parasitosis, in an hiv patient: beliefs in the age of the internet. Psychosomatics, 51 (6), 453-7 PMID: 21051675

When Is A Placebo Not A Placebo?

Irving Kirsch, best known for that 2008 meta-analysis allegedly showing that "Prozac doesn't work", has hit the headlines again.

This time it's a paper claiming that something does work. Actually Kirsch is only a minor author on the paper by Kaptchuck et al: Placebos without Deception.

In essence, they asked whether a placebo treatment - a dummy pill with no active ingredients - works even if you know that it's a placebo. Conventional wisdom would say no, because the placebo effect is driven by the patient's belief in the effectiveness of the pill.

Kaptchuck et al took 80 patients with Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) and recruited them into a trial of "a novel mind-body management study of IBS". Half of the patients got no treatment at all. The other half got inert cellulose capsules, after having been told, truthfully, that the pills contained no active drugs but also having been told to expect improvement in a 15 minute briefing session on the grounds that

placebo pills, something like sugar pills, have been shown in rigorous clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes.

Guess what? The placebo group did better than the no treatment group, or at least they reported that they did (all the outcomes were subjective). The article has been much blogged about, and you should read those posts for a more detailed and in some cases skeptical examination, but really, this is entirely unsurprising and doesn't challenge the conventional wisdom about placebos.

The folks in this trial believed in the possibility that the pills would make them feel better. They just wouldn't have agreed to take part otherwise. And when those people got the treatment that they expected to work, they felt better. That's just the plain old placebo effect. We already know that the placebo effect is very strong in IBS, a disease which is, at least in many cases, psychosomatic.

So the only really new result here is that there are people out there who'll believe that they'll experience improvement from sugar pills, if you give them a 15 minute briefing about the "mind-body self-healing" properties of those pills. That's an interesting addition to the record of human quirkiness, but it doesn't really tell us anything new about placebos.

Kaptchuk, T., Friedlander, E., Kelley, J., Sanchez, M., Kokkotou, E., Singer, J., Kowalczykowski, M., Miller, F., Kirsch, I., & Lembo, A. (2010). Placebos without Deception: A Randomized Controlled Trial in Irritable Bowel Syndrome PLoS ONE, 5 (12) DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0015591

When Is A Placebo Not A Placebo?

Irving Kirsch, best known for that 2008 meta-analysis allegedly showing that "Prozac doesn't work", has hit the headlines again.

This time it's a paper claiming that something does work. Actually Kirsch is only a minor author on the paper by Kaptchuck et al: Placebos without Deception.

In essence, they asked whether a placebo treatment - a dummy pill with no active ingredients - works even if you know that it's a placebo. Conventional wisdom would say no, because the placebo effect is driven by the patient's belief in the effectiveness of the pill.

Kaptchuck et al took 80 patients with Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) and recruited them into a trial of "a novel mind-body management study of IBS". Half of the patients got no treatment at all. The other half got inert cellulose capsules, after having been told, truthfully, that the pills contained no active drugs but also having been told to expect improvement in a 15 minute briefing session on the grounds that

placebo pills, something like sugar pills, have been shown in rigorous clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes.

Guess what? The placebo group did better than the no treatment group, or at least they reported that they did (all the outcomes were subjective). The article has been much blogged about, and you should read those posts for a more detailed and in some cases skeptical examination, but really, this is entirely unsurprising and doesn't challenge the conventional wisdom about placebos.

The folks in this trial believed in the possibility that the pills would make them feel better. They just wouldn't have agreed to take part otherwise. And when those people got the treatment that they expected to work, they felt better. That's just the plain old placebo effect. We already know that the placebo effect is very strong in IBS, a disease which is, at least in many cases, psychosomatic.

So the only really new result here is that there are people out there who'll believe that they'll experience improvement from sugar pills, if you give them a 15 minute briefing about the "mind-body self-healing" properties of those pills. That's an interesting addition to the record of human quirkiness, but it doesn't really tell us anything new about placebos.

Kaptchuk, T., Friedlander, E., Kelley, J., Sanchez, M., Kokkotou, E., Singer, J., Kowalczykowski, M., Miller, F., Kirsch, I., & Lembo, A. (2010). Placebos without Deception: A Randomized Controlled Trial in Irritable Bowel Syndrome PLoS ONE, 5 (12) DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0015591

Exercise and Depression: It's Complicated

Some ideas seem so nice, so inoffensive and so harmless, that it seems a shame to criticize them.

Take the idea that exercise is a useful treatment for depression. It's got something for everyone.

For doctors, it's attractive because it means they can recommend exercise - which is free, quick, and easy, at least for them - instead of spending the time and money on drugs or therapy. Governments like it for the same reason, and because it's another way of improving the nation's fitness. For people who don't much like psychiatry, exercise offers a lovely alternative to psych drugs - why take those nasty antidepressants if exercise will do just as well? And so on.

But this doesn't mean it's true. And a large observational study from Norway has just cast doubt on it: Physical activity and common mental disorders.

The authors took a large community sample of Norwegian people, the HUNT-2 study, which was done between 1995 and 1997. Over 90,000 people were invited to take part and full data were available from over 40,000.

What they found was that there was an association between taking part in physical exercise as a leisure activity, and lower self-reported symptoms of depression. It didn't matter whether the activity was intense or mild, and it didn't really matter how often you did it: so long as you did it, you got the benefit.

Crucially, however, the same was not true of physical exercise which was part of your job. That didn't help at all, and indeed the most strenuous jobs were associated with more depression (but less anxiety, strangely).

How does this fit with the very popular idea that exercise helps in depression? Well, many randomized trials have indeed shown exercise to be better than not-exercize for depression, but the problem is that these trials are never really placebo controlled. You can usually tell whether or not you're going jogging in the park every morning.

So the direct effects of exercise per se are hard to distinguish from the social and psychological meaning of "exercise". Knowing that you're starting a program of exercise could make you feel better: you're taking positive action to improve your life, you're not helpless in the face of your problems. By contrast, doing heavy work as part of your job, while physiologically beneficial, is unlikely to be so much fun.

This doesn't mean that telling people to get more exercise isn't a good idea, but if the meaning of exercise is more important than the physiology, that has some big implications for how it ought to be used.

It's good news for people who just can't take part in strenuous physical exercise because of physical illness or disability, something which is quite common in mental health. It suggests that these people could still get the benefits attributed to exercise even if they did less demanding forms of meaningful activity.

But it's bad news for doctors tempted to default to "get out and go jogging" whenever they see a potentially depressed person. Because if it's the meaning of exercise that counts, and you recommend exercise in a way which sounds like you're dismissing their problems, the meaning will be anything but helpful.

In clinical trials of exercise, the exercise program has, almost by definition, a positive value: it's the whole point of the trial. And the participants just wouldn't have volunteered for the trial if they didn't, on some level, think it would make them feel better.

But not everyone thinks that way. If you go to your doctor looking to get medication, or psychotherapy, or something like that, and you're told that all you need to do is go and get more exercise, it would be easy to see that as a brush-off, especially if it's done unsympathetically. The point is, if exercise doesn't feel like a positive step, it probably won't be one.

Harvey SB, Hotopf M, Overland S, & Mykletun A (2010). Physical activity and common mental disorders. The British journal of psychiatry : the journal of mental science, 197, 357-64 PMID: 21037212

Exercise and Depression: It's Complicated

Some ideas seem so nice, so inoffensive and so harmless, that it seems a shame to criticize them.

Take the idea that exercise is a useful treatment for depression. It's got something for everyone.

For doctors, it's attractive because it means they can recommend exercise - which is free, quick, and easy, at least for them - instead of spending the time and money on drugs or therapy. Governments like it for the same reason, and because it's another way of improving the nation's fitness. For people who don't much like psychiatry, exercise offers a lovely alternative to psych drugs - why take those nasty antidepressants if exercise will do just as well? And so on.

But this doesn't mean it's true. And a large observational study from Norway has just cast doubt on it: Physical activity and common mental disorders.

The authors took a large community sample of Norwegian people, the HUNT-2 study, which was done between 1995 and 1997. Over 90,000 people were invited to take part and full data were available from over 40,000.

What they found was that there was an association between taking part in physical exercise as a leisure activity, and lower self-reported symptoms of depression. It didn't matter whether the activity was intense or mild, and it didn't really matter how often you did it: so long as you did it, you got the benefit.

Crucially, however, the same was not true of physical exercise which was part of your job. That didn't help at all, and indeed the most strenuous jobs were associated with more depression (but less anxiety, strangely).

How does this fit with the very popular idea that exercise helps in depression? Well, many randomized trials have indeed shown exercise to be better than not-exercize for depression, but the problem is that these trials are never really placebo controlled. You can usually tell whether or not you're going jogging in the park every morning.

So the direct effects of exercise per se are hard to distinguish from the social and psychological meaning of "exercise". Knowing that you're starting a program of exercise could make you feel better: you're taking positive action to improve your life, you're not helpless in the face of your problems. By contrast, doing heavy work as part of your job, while physiologically beneficial, is unlikely to be so much fun.

This doesn't mean that telling people to get more exercise isn't a good idea, but if the meaning of exercise is more important than the physiology, that has some big implications for how it ought to be used.

It's good news for people who just can't take part in strenuous physical exercise because of physical illness or disability, something which is quite common in mental health. It suggests that these people could still get the benefits attributed to exercise even if they did less demanding forms of meaningful activity.

But it's bad news for doctors tempted to default to "get out and go jogging" whenever they see a potentially depressed person. Because if it's the meaning of exercise that counts, and you recommend exercise in a way which sounds like you're dismissing their problems, the meaning will be anything but helpful.

In clinical trials of exercise, the exercise program has, almost by definition, a positive value: it's the whole point of the trial. And the participants just wouldn't have volunteered for the trial if they didn't, on some level, think it would make them feel better.

But not everyone thinks that way. If you go to your doctor looking to get medication, or psychotherapy, or something like that, and you're told that all you need to do is go and get more exercise, it would be easy to see that as a brush-off, especially if it's done unsympathetically. The point is, if exercise doesn't feel like a positive step, it probably won't be one.

Harvey SB, Hotopf M, Overland S, & Mykletun A (2010). Physical activity and common mental disorders. The British journal of psychiatry : the journal of mental science, 197, 357-64 PMID: 21037212